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vs 
ADDAM SWAPP, 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
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BRIEF 1 'F APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
1 This is an Appeal from, a final Order of Conviction and 
Sent e n c 11 i g :I a i: e d J a, i 1i i a r > 2 6 , ,] 9 8 9 , a i i • ,:I f :i : • : :i i i 1: i I e d e i I i a I o f a M o t: ] o n 
for a Bill of P a r t i c u l a r s on N o v e m b e r 16 198 9., b e f o r e the 
, vge of the T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t 
~ .,:: .^ah. 
•i.ed ;jy an, Amended Notice of Appeal on 
. : O : J : I J : I over -his Appeal by virtue of 
26 '2a; am u
 y , a;:^  R^t= ^ of the Rules 
4 *- riioi appeais ;:av- been f.l-". i h :-s.l: of the State 
Criminal Proceedings against the defendant. 
Honorable Michael R. M- : r. \ 
C o u r t , S umm 11, C o u n t y „ : ar.
2. This appeal was f 
F -=> r 
U r a n C o a e Anr.oiared " - 3 5 -
1 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Several appeals have been filed and yet undecided as a result 
o f t i i e d e f e i i' i a n t s • : : i i i c t ] D n s :i i 1 11 i e F e d e r a ) D i s t: r :i : t C o i 11: t: D I t h e 
S t a t e o f U t ah . I n t he U m t ed States Di s t r i c t Cour t the defendant 
was ;o::v:c:^ ' :\ March 9 , 1988 , of counts I 11 , 111 , I^  
V11 , c • . - - ;. i p e r c e d :i i i g I n d i :: 11; i i e i I t T h o s e :: o u i 11: s : .. s 
foilows : 
COUNT I- Maliciously damaging,, r-- ;r - of an explosive, a 
building used in interstate commerce ^: r c 5^^ ;: ^  and 2 ) ; 
COUNT IT- Using a deadly and dangerous weapon a bomb :^. the 
c '• mm; s s ; r n ^ * h ^  ^  r i m<" ~ r M C . 
s(c) (1) and 2) ; 
C0UNT 111- A11 empt ed murder of officers of the Federal Bureau 
o i: 11 i v e s 11 g a 11 o i I (13 I J, S , C . s .1 1 1 4 a: I d 2 ) ; 
COUNT IV - Using a deadly and dangerous weapon (a firearm") in 
the commission of the cr:i me of v: o 1 ence descr i k e• :i : n Co \ :,nt I 11 (' .1 3 
U.S., C. s. 92 4 (c) (1) and 2 ) ; 
C 0 U N T • K n o w i n g i y a r, i fore i b 1 y a s s a u 111 n g , res i s 11 n g , 
o p p o s i n g :i m p e d :i i i g ,  :: i 1 1 :i i i 11 d a 11 n g , a n d i n t e r f e r 11 i g \ / :I :: i i p e r s D I i s 
designated :i i :i 18 U , S , C s . 1 1 i 4 ( en ume rate d federal office r s ) 
m e 1 udlng of f i cers and emp I oy ees of the Bur eau of A1 coho 1 Tobacco 
a n d F :i :t: e a r i i i s \ i1: i :i i e s a :i d :> f f i c e :i : s a i I d e i i i p i D \ e e s w e i e e i i g age a j i : a n d 
2 
on account of the performance of their official duties. Further, 
that appellant used a dangerous and deadly firearm in the 
commission of the offense (18 U.S.C. s.lll and 2); 
COUNT VI - Knowingly possessing an unregistered destructive 
device (a bomb) (26 U.S.C. s.5861) (d) and 18 U.S.C. s.2); and 
COUNT VII - Using a deadly and dangerous weapon (a firearm) 
in the commission of the crime of violence described in Count V (18 
U.S.C s.924 (c) (1) and 2); 
On September 12, 1988, Appellant filed Motion for a New Trial 
which was denied on September 14. On September 30, 1988, the above 
Court docketed the Appeal and assigned it the number 88-2516. 
In February, 1989, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals issued 
an Order to Show Cause why the case should not be remanded for re-
sentencing pursuant to Mistretta vs. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647 
(1989). On March 6, 1989, the case was remanded for re-sentencmg, 
and re-sentencing took place on April 20, 1989, pursuant to the 
Sentencing Reforact. On January 4, 1989, the trial judge issued 
his memorandum opinion of why certain counts were deferred 
(addendum). 
The defendant was re-sentenced to 5 years pursuant to Count 
I of the Amended Superceding Indictment ; Count II of the Amended 
Superceding Indictment was deferred; Count III was stayed and the 
defendant placed on probation to run concurrently with ali other 
probations on other counts; Count IV the defendant was given 5 
3 
years imprisonment to run consecutively with Count I; Count V was 
stayed and the defendant placed on probation to run concurrently 
with all other probations on other counts; Count VI the defendant 
was given a term of imprisonment of 5 years to run consecutively 
to the terms of imprisonment in Counts I and IV; Count VII was 
stayed and the defendant placed on probation to run concurrently 
with all other probations on other counts. 
On December 22, 1988, the jury in the above case returned a 
guilty verdict against Addam Swapp and John Timothy Singer for 
Manslaughter and against Jonathon Swapp for negligent homicide. 
Addam Swapp and John Timothy Singer were charged with second degree 
murder, a first degree felony, and the court sentenced the 
defendants to one to fifteen (1-15) years in the Utah State 
Penitentiary which will run consecutively to and at the end of any 
and all determinate sentences imposed in United States vs. Addam 
Swapp, 88-CR-006J with the limitations that, in accordance with 
Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code Annotated the aggregate maximum term 
of ail sentences imposed in this case and the above Federal case 
shall in no event exceed thirty (30) years. Jonathon Swapp was 
sentenced to twelve (12) months in the Salt Lake County Jail to run 
consecutively with his federal sentence, credit for time served was 
given consistent with the sentencing Decision and Order attached 
hereto as an Exhibit. 
An appeal from that sentence and from a denial of defendant's 
Motion for a Bill of Particulars and the denial of defendant's 
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Motion to Dismiss was timely made on January 26, 1989, and by an 
Amended Notice of Appeal of February 2, 1989, to the above-entitled 
Court. 
5 
RELATED APPEALS 
Although no prior appeals have been made concerning the 
defendant's State Trial there have been a number of appeals which 
may be relevant to the sentencing issue of the instant appeal. 
In the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, 
that court has before it in NOs. 89-4090 and 89-4095 the 
governments appeal based on the alleged error by the Federal Trial 
Court in deferring sentencing of Addam Swapp on Count II of the 
Amended Superceding Indictment. That appeal is scheduled to be 
argued in August, 1990, along with related appeals and may have 
some influence on the issues in the case at bar. Therefore the 
defendant is including his Answer Brief. The defendant may be 
sentenced to an additional 5 years of consecutive imprisonment as 
a result of that appeal. 
6 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court abuse it's discretion in denying a Motion 
for Bill of Particulars when theories charged in the Information 
are non-specific as to the actus reas of the Defendant. 
May a Defendant be sentenced to concurrent, as distinguished 
from consecutive sentences, in State Court where he has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment which would exceed Utah Code 
Annotated 76-3-401 (4). 
Should a Defendant be sentenced to consecutive terms of 
imprisonment for a charge which arose out of, and is an integral 
part of the same criminal episode. 
7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Circumstances leading to the facts which have proceeded 
charges of the defendant in this case are well known in this state. 
They begin with the January 1979, death of John Singer by a law 
enforcement officer in Marion, Utah. The life and death of John 
Singer was subject to wide publicity concerning his desire to 
educate his children outside of the public school system, his 
beliefs concerning polygamy, government, and his insistence upon 
religious freedom and his right to privacy. 
A few years after John Singer's death Addam Swapp and his 
brother Jonathan moved onto the Singer farm and Addam married two 
of John Singers' daughter. Shortly, thereafter, there ensued a 
series of minor conflicts with the immediate neighbors and 
religious leaders. On January 16, 1988, at 3:00 a.m., Addam Swapp 
detonated a bomb in the LDS Stake Center in Marion, Utah. During 
the next thirteen days Addam and Jonathan Swapp, John Timothy 
Singer, Addams' wives, Vickie Singer, and related children, were 
surrounded by up to two hundred law enforcement personnel together 
with various aspects of the news media. 
During the siege there were arc lights directed at the house 
and there were attempts to shoot out the lights. There were sirens 
and speakers directing noise towards the farmhouse and there were 
attempts to shoot out those speakers or to otnerwise 
physically disable them, (Partial TR. P. 21-28), and there were as 
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many as one hundred rounds fired during the thirteen days towards 
the lights and speakers, (Partial TR. P. 69). There were various 
other incidents of confrontation between the defendant, his 
brother, and law enforcement, during the thirteen days, (Partial 
TR. P. 24, 25, 85, 87). On the last day of the siege, January 28, 
1988, law enforcement officers attempted to capture Addam Swapp 
which attempt erupted into gunfire, which, ultimately resulted in 
the death of Officer Fred House. 
The defendant, Addam Swapp, was charged with Murder in the 
second degree as follows: 
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the second degree, a first degree 
felony, in Summit County, Utah, on or about January 28, 1988, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203 (a), (b), and/or (c), 
and Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, in that the defendants, Addam W. Swapp, Jonathan R. Swapp, 
and John Timothy Singer, as parties to the offense, intentionally 
or knowingly caused the death of Fred House; and/or intending to 
cause serious bodily injury to another, said defendants committed 
an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of 
Fred House; and/or acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, said defendants knowingly engaged in 
conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
caused the death of Fred House. 
On or about November 16, 1989, the defendants Motion for Bill 
Particulars was denied, and the defendants were convicted of 
Manslaughter and sentenced as aforesaid. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
BILL OF PARTICULARS 
The prosecution elected to charge the defendants in the alternative 
with three separate possible theories of murder concerning most of 
Utah Code Annotated 76-5-203. They charged that the defendants as 
parties to the offense 
(a) intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Fred House 
and/or 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the 
defendant committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that 
caused the death of Fred House and/or 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved in-
difference to human life, the defendant engages in conduct which 
creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the 
death of Fred House. 
The defendant was charged with completing one or all of the 
above "on or about January 28, 1988 M. 
If we assume that by charging "on or about January 28, 1983" 
the State was thereby not limited in its proof to the day of 
January 28, 1988, we have then a thirteen day period being used as 
proof of a homicide. That the State did in fact intend to rely on 
such proof is evidenced by their probable cause statement filed 
10 
with the Information (Record at R.0249) and the conduct of the 
trial where all the known events of the thirteen day period prior 
to January 28, 1988 were explored in the State's case in chief. 
In the written response to defendant's Motion for a Bill of 
Particulars the State referred to the Probable Cause Affidavit as 
facts supplied by the defendant to obviate his need for a Bill of 
Particulars (Record at R.0006). 
Therefore we have presented a thirteen day period with 
hundreds of discreet facts, ail of which may or may not be used as 
proof of the elements of any one of the three theories of the crime 
alleged. If we take this situation together with the fact that the 
defendant was charged along with Jonathan Swapp and John Timothy 
Singer as parties to the offense we have a complex problem for the 
defense. 
The prosecution is able to choose which of the hundreds of 
facts of the thirteen day siege it will use to prosecute one or ail 
of the three theories it may choose and which combination of 
defendants preformed which acts of whichever theory. Without a 
Bill of Particulars the prosecution may excercise its discretion 
as to which theories, which facts and which parties and in what 
combination(s), up to the point of resting its case-in-chief 
without ever disclosing these to the defense. 
The foregoing is the situation the defendant claims is 
untenable, unfair, and unlawful. It is unfair because the defense 
11 
is hampered in anticipating whether or not it must be prepared to 
rebut all three theories of murder and which facts will be used for 
which theory with which combination of defendants. The defendant 
must then be prepared on ail three theories and with ail possible 
facts of the thirteen day siege and with all possible combinations 
of the three defendants even though the prosecution may have one 
theory, a limited number of facts and a specific combination of 
defendants as applied to the theory and to the limited number of 
facts. The burden on the defense is that will be arguably less 
prepared because its efforts will be spent on preparation of 
matters which may never be tried, or the defedant is required to 
guess at which facts support which theories and which combination 
of factors and by guessing,, be at his peril. 
u.C.A. 77-35-4(e) contemplates that a Bill of Particulars may be 
used to assist the defendant in his defense: 
When facts not set out in an information or indictment are 
required to inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the 
offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare his defense, 
the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of 
particulars. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees, "In 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him [and] to 
have a copy thereof.ff There are other purposes to a Bill of 
12 
Particulars but at least U.C.A. 77-35-4(e)(Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 4[e]) and the Utah Constitution announce that the accused 
shall be informed of the nature and cause of the offense. A motion 
for a Bill of Particulars may be used for this purpose. State vs. 
Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987). 
If it is granted that the accused is entitled to know the 
nature and cause of the offense, did the Information in the case 
at bar so inform the defendant as to allow the opporitunity to 
prepare and present his defense? 
The Information charges three ways the defendant may have 
murdered the victim. The Information does not recite which way the 
defendant murdered him but that at least one of the methods was 
used. However, more importantly, the Information by the use of 
"and/or" charges that the defendant may have committed the crime 
by any combination of the three theories. Any defendant then as 
he prepares his defense must anticipate, without a 3ill of 
Particulars, which of the nine combinations of the theories in the 
Information he must challenge. However, that is not the problem 
that perplexes the defendant most. 
The prosecution did not contend at trial or at preliminary 
hearing that defendant (Addam Swapp) fired any shot on the day ef 
the death of Fred House (Dec. 19, 1988 transcript p. 24 & 25). The 
prosecution has never maintained that the defendant asked any other 
person to fire at Fred House. (Dec. 19, 1988 transcript p.24 & 25). 
How then, by what means, did the defendant murder Fred House? 
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The closest the defendant ever came to learning the 
prosecution1s theory came at closing (transcript of Dec. 19, 1988 
at p. 24). 
The State's theory is that Addam Swapp set in motion events 
which naturally and foreseeably led to the death of Officer 
House and that he encouraged others by his behavior by his 
leadership role, that I think despite his protestations 
about it, is clear. That he was the leader up there 
and that other were acting in concert with him in resisting 
law enforcement officers. And the case really boils 
down to this, and that is, for a perceived injustice 
Addam Swapp blew up a church in an act of vengeance, and 
then held at bay law enforcement officers for some fifteen 
days . 
At oral arguement in response to defendant's Motion for Bill 
of Particulars the State responded (transcript Nov. 16, 18, & 25 
at page 79) 
Mr Horton: Your Honor, in this particular case I don't 
know what more the State could do in terms of a bill of 
particulars. The State has laid out an extensive probable 
cause statement. Mr. Bucher has been through not only a 
preliminary hearing in this matter, but he had an 
opportunity to review a memorandum that the State has filed 
regarding the theories of liability. 
Not only that, also two memoranda filed regarding 404B and 
the use of other prior bad acts. I think that he can't, 
at this point, claim that he doesn't understand what theory 
is or what the State's evidence is. 
and at page 80 supra 
The second degree homicide theories are separable and one 
is intentionally or knowingly, one is intending to cause 
serious bodily injury to another, and one is the deprived 
indifference theory. And I think that it's no surprise to 
Mr. Bucher that we are taking an approach that in order to 
put Addam Swapp's criminal liability into proper 
perspective you cannot simply take morning of January 28. 
You have to take into account the fact that he bombed the 
church, that he thereafter refused to negotiate in any 
manner with the law enforcement people, 
notwithstanding personal visits from intermediaries, and 
notwithstanding a letter from the governor. 
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Notwithstanding any other entreaties that may have been 
made and that situation was highly fraught with danger to 
all concerned. And in light of that, he continued and 
pursued this course of lawful activity, which very 
foreseeably resulted in someone being killed on the 
morning of January 28. I don't believe that there can be 
any confusion about the State's theory or what will be 
presented. It's fully been set out in our pleadings and 
inventory of reports which Mr. Bucher has been aware of 
for months and months. It's also clearly set out in a 
probable cause statement, and in our various memos 
regarding liability. 
The problem with all of the pretrail arguments by the State 
in opposition to the Bill of Particulars is that they do not meet 
the point. 
The prosecution disclosed its three theories and the 
prosecution disclosed the facts of what the defendants did during 
the thirteen day seige but they refused to disclose which of the 
facts upon which they would rely to prove which theory. That is, 
if there are a great number of facts, any number of which may be 
used to prove three alternative theories of how something was done, 
is not the accused allowed to know how it was that they claim he 
did the "something" of which he is charged. Merely making all data 
available does not inform the accused of what data is claimed to 
show culpabilty. 
In State vs . Bel 1 , 770 P. 2d 100 (Utah 1988) the Supreme Court 
was faced with an Information which followed the statutory language 
and made reference to a ten month period wherein the crime of 
racketeering was committed. In response to the defendant's Motion 
for a Bill of Particulars the State supplied a generalized 
15 
statement of facts which would be used to establish the crime. 
In the present case, the Information charges the language of 
the statute and the State's response to the request for particulars 
was not even as generous as in Bell supra; the State in this case 
merely exhibited the probable cause statement and said the 
defendant should know from that and from his previous trial of what 
he is charged. Again, this is spurious because in no paper or set 
of papers is it declared by what means, specific or general, 
defendant Addam Swapp murdered Fred House. 
As the Court in Bell stated at p.107: 
Also, we think it important to clarify that we reject the 
implication of the State's argument: that the State, 
having failed to provide even a minimally adequate bill of 
particulars despite persistent requests from Bell, can 
excuse that failure under the guise of harmless error by 
claiming that Bell had pretrial access to a mass of various 
items of information from which, one can conclude in 
hindsight, Bell could have gleaned the State's theories for 
the essential elements of the crimes charged. For this 
Court to accept such an argument would not only vitiate the 
specific requirements of rule 4(e), it would negate the 
accused's constitutional right, implemented by rule 4(e), 
to "have a copy" of a document setting out in clear terms 
"the nature and cause of the accusation." 
The Bel 1 Court quoted State vs.Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 
1987) with approval that even if the Information is pled correctly 
the defendant is still entitled to a plain and concise statement 
of what he is charged. Simply pointing to facts and theories that 
the government could use to establish a crime should not be 
adaquet. 
When a charging paper accuses in such a way whereby it is not 
obvious as to what the accused did to violate the statute a 
16 
specific Bill should be granted. State vs. Jones , 748 P.2d 839 
(Kansas 1988); Kogan vs. People, 756 P.2d 945 (Colorado 1988); 
State vs. Kmcaid, 730 Or. App 23, 714 P.2d 624 ( 1935). 
The defendant believes he has the general constitutional right to 
know clearly and concisely of what he is charged and he believes 
he has a more specific right depending on the facts surrounding his 
invoiement with the crime and how the prosecution chooses to charge 
the crime. 
The latter right is addressed in Bell and Fulton supra in 
those parts of the holding which contain the discussions of the 
specific charges. The right is just not dependant on whether or 
not the prosecution chooses to charge in the alternative but on 
whether the character of the defendant's act is concretely and 
specifically enunciated. 
For example, if an actor were to enter a bank and point a 
firearm at a teller and demand money the prosecution may (subject 
to other concerns) elect to charge him in the alternative with one 
or a combination of crimes, but what the actor is alleged to have 
actually and physically done to commit whatever the prosecution 
charges may be set out and alleged in a short sentence. Such a 
defendant would likely as not ever ask for a Bill of Particulars 
even if a description of his act were deleted from the charging 
papers. 
As that simple hypothetical becomes more complex so does the 
17 
right to have a Bill of Particulars become clearer. If the 
prosecution chooses they can charge alternate ways an actor may be 
culpable of several crimes or alternate ways he can be guilty of 
one crime but those acts of omissions that it is claimed he did to 
subject himself to the theories of criminal behavior must be set 
out. 
In Addam Swapp's case, during the thirteen day siege he 
performed many acts which made him liable for several crimes and 
many acts which were neutral and noncriminal and may be alleged to 
be criminal but are, in isolation, neutral. 
For example Addam Swapp shot at speakers and lights. That 
subjected him to two or three federal crimes and perhaps state 
crimes. Did that same activity constitute acts which the State 
alleges are evidences of one of the theories of murder? 
Addam Swapp also did those commonplace activities of which 
would be natural in the circumstances. He barricaded and enclosed 
his family, he went for water, goat's milk, and wood, he ate, he 
prayed, he saw to the personal hygiene of himself and his family 
{Dec. 14, 1988 Transcript pp. 150-194). Those acts could oe used 
as elements of one of the three theories of the prosecution. 
However, there could be countless other acts which the 
prosecution intends to allege that were not committed at ail or 
13 
that someone else committed. Of those kinds of acts., not only does 
the defendant not know what they are but does not know how they are 
going to be connected by the prosecution into one or ail of the 
three murder theories. Whether or not an Information charges with 
enough particularity must be subject to a case by case approach. 
A defendant could be charged as Addam Swapp has been and simply 
furnishing discovery would obviate a Bill of Particulars in a case 
where it were clear what the defendant did to cause death, or to 
create a grave risk of death. 
The problem is exacerbated by the "and/or" method of pleading 
the theories of murder. Is Addam Swapp to assume that he is 
charged with acting in concert with his co-defendants, that the 
three of them ail did those acts necessary to prove U.C.A. 76-5-
203 (a) and (b) and (c) ? Or is he to assume that one or more of 
the co-defendants did some of the acts necessary to prove (a) but 
not (b) or (c) or is he to assume that one or more of the co-
defendants did some of the acts of (a), (b), and (c) and he did the 
other acts. Which acts is he to assume that he is charged and 
which acts are his co-defendants and which co-defendant and which 
theory? If he knew which acts went where he could negate his Mens 
rea as to those acts or he could rebut that the acts were committed 
by any co-defendant or that the acts do not add up to the corpus 
of the crime. 
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CONCURRENT SENTENCES 
Utah Code Annotated 75-3-401 (4) and (5) read at' the time of 
the sentencing of the defendant as follows: 
(4) If a court lawfully determined to impose consecutive 
sentences, the aggregate minimum of ail sentences imposed 
may not exceed twelve years' imprisonment and the aggregate 
maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed thirty 
years' imprisonment. however, this limitation does not 
apply if an offense for which defendant is sentenced 
authorizes the death penalty or life imprisonment. 
The limitation in subsection (4) applies: 
5) (a) If a defendant is sentenced at the same time for more 
than one offense; 
(b) If a defendant is sentenced at different times for 
one or more offenses, all of which were committed prior 
to imposition of sentence for any one or more of them; 
(c) If a defendant has already been sentenced by a court 
of this state other than the present sentencing court or 
by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction. 
The Stace trial court sentenced the defendant to one to 
fifteen years in tne Utah State Prison to run consecutively to any 
other federal sentence imposed with the condition that ail 
sentences could not exceed thirty years (see Sentencing Decision 
ana Order attached hereto as an Exhibit). 
The defendant was re-sentenced to a fifteen year sentence on 
April 20, 1989 by the Honorable Bruce Jenkins, Chief Judge of the 
United States District Court for Utah. That sentence was appealed 
by the United States on the grounds that an additional five year 
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sentence could not be "deferred" as to Count VII of the Federal 
Amended Superceding Indictment. Consequently, the defendant 
received a fifteen year federal sentence with the possibility of 
an additional five years. 
The defendant objects to the State Court sentence on the 
grounds that it violates Utah Code Annotated 76-3-401 (4) and (5). 
The plain reading of the statute is that the aggregate minimum of 
all sentences shall not exceed twelve years and this is invoked if 
the defendant has already been sentenced by a court of federal 
jurisdiction. 
The trial court sentenced the defendant to a maximum of thirty 
years for ail sentences. (see Sentencing order as an Exhibit 
herein) Thusly, the trial court followed that part of the statute 
dealing with a maximum term but failed to employ the minimum 
sentence term of the statute. 
There seems little doubt that the general rule regarding the 
interpretation of penal statutes is that they are to be construed 
strictly and if there exists ambiguity or vagueness, the statute 
should be construed in favor of the accused. Wha1 en vs U.S., 63 
L. Ed.2d 715, 100 S. Ct. 1432 (1980); 73 Am Jor.2d 295. 
The defendant however does not insist that the statute is 
ambiguous. The plain reading of it is not a consecutive sentence 
is impermissible if what is created is a sentence in excess of a 
twelve year minimum. It is urged that this is the only permissible 
conclusion when the doctrine of plain or literal construction is 
applied. 73 Am Jur. 2d 302. 
It is also clear that sections (4) and (5) of U.C.A. 76-3-401 
should be read together as they are in pari materia in that they 
relate to the same subject matter. State vs Flynn, 137 Or. 8, 299 
P. 694. 
Section 7.06 of the Model Penal Code reads in pertinent part 
as foilows: 
(i) Sentences of Imprisonment for More Than One Crime. 
When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed en a 
defendant for more than one crime, including a crime for 
which a previous suspended sentence of probation has been 
revoked, such multiple sentences shall run concurrently or 
consecutively as the Court determines at the time of 
sentence, except that: 
(a) a definite and an indefinite term shall run 
concurrently and both sentences shall be satisfied by 
service of the indefinite term; and 
(b) the aggregate of consecutive definite terms shall 
not exceed one year; and 
(c) the aggregate of consecutive indefinite terms 
shall not exceed in minimum or maximum length the 
longest extended term authorized for the highest grade 
and degree of crime for which any of the sentences was 
imposed; and 
(d) not more than one sentence for an extended term 
shall be imposed. 
The explanatory Notes and Commentaries refer to the general 
considerations given to the promulgation of Section 7.06. 
The explanatory note reads: 
Section 7.06 deals generally with many facets 
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of multiple sentences for different 
offenses. It reflects two basic 
principles: that the choice between 
consecutive and concurrent sentences is 
one that should be left to the court, 
and that a reasonable limit should be 
set on the extent to which multiple 
sentences can be cumulated. 
Subsection (i) implements these 
principles by proving, in the case of 
multiple felony convictions, that the 
extended term for the most serious 
offense for which the defendant is to be 
sentenced is the longest term to which 
he can be sentenced, but that sentences 
can be cumulated within that limitation. 
The premises that the extended term 
limit, designed for the persistent 
offender, the professional criminal and 
the dangerous, mentally abnormal 
offender, is also an appropriate gauge 
for the multiple offender. Subsection 
(1) also provides that a definite and an 
indefinite term shall run concurrently, 
with the sentences satisfied by service 
of the indefinite term. It also 
restricts the aggregate of consecutive 
definite sentences to a period of one 
year, which was- viewed as the outside 
limitation on any sentence to a local 
facility that does not provide a 
meaningful correctional program and 
parole opportunities. 
Subsection (2) is grounded on the 
principle that the timing of trials or 
the number of trials for different 
offenses should not affect the 
limitations established by Subsection 
(1). Thus, if a defendant has committed 
two offenses, the sentencing limitations 
established by this section will apply 
if he is tried separately for the two 
crimes as well as if he is tried for 
both offenses at the same time. 
Subsection (2) also sets forth other 
principles to control the situation in 
which the defendant is being sentenced 
for an offense that was committed prior 
to the imposition of another 
sentence .... 
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Subsection (5) provides the rules by 
which multiple sentences of imprisonment 
shall be calculated. In effect the 
defendant is to be viewed as though he 
were serving one sentence. In the case 
of concurrent sentences, his term is 
fixed by the longest minimum term and 
the longest maximum term to which he is 
subject In the case of consecutive 
sentences, the minimum terms are 
aggregated and the maximum terms are 
aggregated, thus producing a single term 
which is measured by the limits. When 
definite and indefinite terms run 
consecutively, the definite term is 
added to both the minimum and the 
maximum of the indefinite term. 
The Model Penal Code then attempts to allow a sentencing 
court to impose consecutive sentences but to place a ceiling on 
those sentences for the obvious reason that different courts often 
have different concerns and sentences may accumulated that are 
simply unfair. In the instant case the federal sentencing court 
had to effectuate those policies embodied in the Sentencing Reform 
Act and related statutes, that is, a fifteen year mandatory term 
of imprisonment. The State Sentencing Court had those concerns 
stated in its Sentencing Order. Those concerns and policies do not 
necessarily have the ultimate limit of consecutive sentences of a 
particular defendant m mind. That is the reason for statutes such 
as U.C.A. 76-3-401. 
In its Summary Decision (attached hereto as an Exhibit) the 
trial court took the view that Section 76-3-401 is not applicable 
if the first sentence was of a "determinate" nature. The statute 
does not state that but rather in subsection (5) specifically 
includes federal sentences. The defendant urges that if the 
statute were written to address a "determinate" issue it would have 
done so and it would have hopefully defined what a "determinate 
sentence" means. We can only assume the legislature intended to 
speak to the speak to the effect of a federal sentence and not to 
a "determinate" one because they chose not to discuss determinate 
sentences but to discuss federal ones. We may only assume that the 
legislature chose not to act when they are silent and that they 
chose to act when they speak 
It should be noted that the defendant Addam Swapp was tried 
and sentenced on the same behaviors and the same acts for which he 
was tried and sentenced in the federal court. The statutes 
changed, the jurisdiction changed but his acts or ommissions were 
identical . 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant believes he was denied the constitutional and 
statutory right to a clear statement of the charges against: him 
by the denial of his Motion of Bill of Particulars and thai, a new 
trial should be afforded him with directions that the Information 
is not sufficient under the circumstances to inform him of what he 
stands accused. 
The defendant believes that the sentence of the State trial 
court should be vacted because it is unlawful under the statute and 
unfair. 
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II 
ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL 
23 5 STATE CAPTIOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
FRED G. METOS 
175 EAST 400 SOUTH SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
ATTORNEY FOR JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER 
cner 
COMES NOW John R. 3uchef//and hereby certifies that a t 
correct, copy of the above/Blrief was sent to the following: 
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EARL S. SPAFFORD 
SPAFFORD AND SPAFFORD 
425 EAST 100 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 34111 
ATTORNEY—FOR JONATHAN SWAP? 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADDAM W. SWAPP, JOHN TIMOTHY 
SINGER, and JONATHAN SWAPP, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY DECISION 
CASE NO. 1218 
The court took under advisement and requested briefs on the 
issue of the courtfs discretion under Section 76-3-401(4), Utah 
Code Ann., to apply consecutive sentences. 
Upon consideration of the briefs submitted, the court hereby 
rules that the prohibition of aggregate minimum sentences 
exceeding 12 years in Section 76-3-401(4) is not applicable when 
the sentence of the first sentencing court is a determinate 
sentence. See People v. Dye. 69 111.2d 298, 371 N.E.2d 630, 633-
34 (1977). 
The sentences of each defendant in Federal Court were 
determinate sentences and were not rendered otherwise by the 
federal statute allowing good time. The sentences to be 
considered under Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code Ann., are those 
actually imposed by the first sentencing court and not the range 
of terms which the first sentencing court has as alternatives 
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prior to imposition of a determinate sentence. Consequently, 
these sentences are not to be considered in determining the 
aggregate minimum sentences under Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code 
Ann. 
While the court is of the view that a proper consideration 
of the federal sentencing scheme resolves the issue concerning 
aggregate minimums, further comment and construction of Section 
76-3-401(4) is appropriate. 
In determining whether consecutive sentences may and should 
be imposed, a court is governed by Subsections 76-3-401(1)-(3), 
which set forth the authority and factors for imposing 
consecutive sentences. The first phrase of Subsection 76-3-
401(4) expressly indicates that it is invoked only if the court 
has already "lawfully determined to impose consecutive 
sentences." The succeeding language concerning limitations on 
aggregate minimums and aggregate maximums, then, does not limit 
the courtfs discretion in imposing consecutive sentences but 
merely dictates the effect of such sentences. For example, if 
the federal sentences in this case had to be considered in 
calculating aggregate minimums under Subsection 76-3-401(4), one 
alternative effect of a consecutive 1 to 15 year state sentence 
could be that it would begin to run concurrent with the federal 
sentence after the eleventh year. 
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While the court need not address such issues in this case, 
it is clear that Subsection 76-3-401(4) addresses the effect of 
consecutive sentences and does not prohibit consecutive sentences 
when the aggregate minimum is exceeded by reason of the 
imposition of a consecutive sentence. This construction of 
Subsection 76-3-401(4) is consistent with the directions to the 
Board of Pardons in Subsection 76-3-401(6) in "determining the 
effect of consecutive sentences." (Emphasis added). 
If any of the defendants view the construction of Subsection 
76-3-401(4) in this Summary Decision to be erroneous and its 
effect is the imposition of an unlawful sentence, their remedy is 
a direct appeal at this time. Absent a contrary construction of 
the statute by subsequent binding precedent, the doctrine of res 
judicata and the law of the case will require any other judge of 
this court to deny a request to correct any of the sentences 
under Section 77-35-22(e), Utah Code Ann., whether presented by 
the Board of Pardons, a motion by a defendant in this case or 
collateral attack. Furthermore, if not challenged now by direct 
appeal, it is arguable that a challenge hereafter under Section 
77-35-22(e) has been waived. 
Dated this 26th day of January, 1989. 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Summary Decision, to the following, 
this 26th dav of January, 1989: 
Creighton C. Horton II 
David J. Schwendiman 
Assistant Attorneys General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
John R. Bucher 
Attorney for Addam W. Swapp 
1518 South 1100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Earl Spafford 
Attorney for Jonathan R. Swapp 
425 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
G. Fred Metos 
Attorney for John Timothy Singer 
175 East 400 South, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADDAM W. SWAPP, JOHN TIMOTHY 
SINGER, and JONATHAN SWAPP, 
Defendants. 
SENTENCING DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 1218 
This matter is before the court for imposition of sentences 
on Addam W. Swapp, Timothy Singer and Jonathan Swapp. 
On December 22, 1988 the jury returned guilty verdicts 
against Addam Swapp and Timothy Singer for Manslaughter and 
against Jonathan Swapp for Negligent Homicide. 
The general circumstances surrounding this case and the 
death of State Corrections Officer Fred House are well and widely 
known. The defendants claim that the pertinent circumstances 
date back to January, 1979 when John Singer was shot by a State 
law enforcement officer during an arrest attempt. John Singer 
had gained notoriety for his religious fundamentalism, practice 
of polygamy and refusal to comply with court orders concerning 
the education of his children at home. Sometime after John 
Singerfs death, Addam Swapp befriended John Singer's widow, 
Vickie Singer, and her children who included defendant Timothy 
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Singer. Thereafter, Addam Swapp moved onto the Singer farm, 
married two of John and Vickie Singer's daughters and adopted at 
least some of the religious beliefs and practices of John Singer. 
In 1987 defendant Jonathan Swapp began working on a construction 
project with his brother Addam and resided at the Singer farm. 
Throughout this period there were conflicts with neighbors 
concerning water and other property rights. The most significant 
events, however, surrounded a lawsuit which Vickie Singer and her 
family filed in Federal District Court seeking damages from 
various Utah public officials and law enforcement officers 
arising from the death of John Singer. Vickie Singer hired a 
noted trial lawyer to pursue her family's claims, the matter 
proceeded through discovery and was eventually dismissed. The 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., was premised on the 
absence of any genuine issue of material fact which would give 
rise to any potential recovery or even the right to have the 
matter submitted to a jury. See, Singer v. Wadman, 595 F.Supp. 
188 (Utah 1982). The dismissal was upheld on appeal and the 
United States Supreme Court declined to review. Singer v. 
Wadman, 745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 
1028 (1985). 
On January 16, 1988, acting upon a purported revelation from 
God and in order to focus attention on perceived injustices 
visited upon the Singer family, Addam Swapp detonated a bomb in a 
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Marion, Utah church building, a Stake Center of the Mormon 
Church. Addam Swapp then retreated to the Singer farm in Marion 
and, along with the other two defendants, engaged in an armed 
resistance to his arrest. For a period of 13 days, these 
defendants held at bay law enforcement personnel from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms, and various Utah law enforcement agencies. It was 
believed by some in the Singer and Swapp household, including 
defendants Addam Swapp and Timothy Singer, that John Singer would 
return from the dead and resolve the standoff. 
In the early morning hours of January 28, 1988, law 
enforcement officers executed a plan to apprehend Addam and 
Jonathan Swapp while they were outside the main building on the 
Singer farm. An exchange of gunfire ensued during the arrest 
attempt and Fred House, a Utah Department of Corrections Officer, 
was shot and killed while releasing trained dogs to subdue the 
two defendants. The evidence leaves little doubt that the shots 
which felled Officer House came from the Singer house and were 
fired by Timothy Singer. 
The defendants, along with Vickie Singer, were tried first 
in United States District Court for the District of Utah on an 
indictment alleging various federal criminal violations. Each of 
these defendants were convicted of various charges and sentenced. 
The killing of Officer House was not a part or element of the 
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federal charges or convictions. Addam Swapp was sentenced to 
three consecutive five year terms. Timothy Singer and Jonathan 
Swapp were each sentenced to two consecutive five year terms. In 
sentencing the defendants, the Court did not apply the federal 
sentencing guidelines as required by the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984. As a result of the United States Supreme Court decision in 
United States v. Mistretta. No. 87-1904 (January 18, 1989), the 
Federal Court may be required to resentence the defendants. Such 
resentencing, however, need not deter this court from imposing 
its sentence at this time for the state convictions. 
The State of Utah then pursued murder charges against these 
defendants and the matter was tried before a jury. As indicated, 
the facts which this court has been able to recite above in a 
mere five paragraphs were well and widely known. Such facts, 
however, pale in comparison to the extensive evidentiary 
presentation to the jury which consumed almost 14 full trial 
days. It is upon this extensive evidence, and not upon the well 
and widely known generalities, that the jury based its verdicts. 
The jury selection process assured the State and the 
defendants that a fair and impartial jury would hear the detailed 
evidence surrounding Officer House's death. The venire panel 
from which the eight deliberating jurors were seated was composed 
of over 200 adult citizens of Summit County. The selection 
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process consumed approximately three and one-half court days. 
The result was a jury panel of eight and two alternates who 
dispassionately considered all of the extensive and detailed 
evidence from the perspective of neutrality and the presumption 
of innocence, not the perspective of persons knowing only some of 
the facts, not from the perspective of those who had disputes 
with the Singer and Swapp families, not from the perspective of 
sympathizers of the defendants, and not from the perspective of 
Officer House's family. 
The verdicts which the jury returned after more than three 
days of deliberations are deserving of respect by all and any 
derision directed at the verdicts reflects a lack of respect for 
law and order, which is exactly the attitude of those who brought 
about the death of Officer House. The selection, composition, 
efforts and verdicts of this Summit County jury have purged any 
perceived cause for embarrassment to Summit County and the State 
of Utah arising from the events surrounding the Singer and Swapp 
families. 
The State originally charged each defendant with Second 
Degree Murder, a first degree felony. The jury found each of the 
defendants not guilty of these charges. These verdicts of not 
guilty reflect the factual determination of the jury that none of 
the defendants intentionally or knowingly caused the death of 
Fred House; that none of these defendants intended to cause 
STATE V. SWAPP PAGE SIX SENTENCING DECISION 
serious bodily injury to anyone; and, that none of these 
defendants acted with a depraved indifference to human life. The 
court assumes that in making this determination the jury could 
well have found from the conflicting evidence that Addam Swapp 
did not shoulder his weapon, that Timothy Singer was firing at 
the trained dogs, and that Jonathan Swapp was not aiming at any 
person when he fired his weapon. 
In returning guilty verdicts against defendants Addam Swapp 
and Timothy Singer for the lesser-included offense of 
Manslaughter, the jury determined that these two caused the death 
of Officer House and they did so under one or more of the 
following circumstances: recklessly; under the influence of 
extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable 
explanation or excuse; or under a reasonable belief that their 
acts were legally justified or excused even though no such 
justification or excuse existed. The guilty verdict against 
defendant Jonathan Swapp reflected a jury finding that he caused 
the death of Fred House while acting with criminal negligence. It 
is from these factual predicates that the court proceeds in the 
exercise of its duty to impose sentence on each defendant. 
Having previously ruled that this court may run its 
sentences' consecutive to the federal sentences, the most 
significant remaining sentencing issues concern whether 
consecutive sentences should be imposed and defendants Addam 
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Swapp's and Timothy Singer's requests to be sentenced for 
offenses lower in degree than the second degree felony for which 
each was convicted. The court is of the view that essentially 
the same considerations are applicable to both issues. 
Section 76-3-401(2), Utah Code Ann., specifies the factors 
for this court to consider in determining whether its sentences 
should run consecutively. The factors are these: the gravity 
and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendants. To a certain extent in 
the application of these factors there is some commonality among 
the defendants. 
While the evidence before this court isolated Addam Swapp as 
the generator of the circumstances giving rise to the siege, each 
of the defendants knowingly and voluntarily participated in the 
standoff. By finding each defendant not guilty of Second Degree 
Murder, the jury has already given the defendants full benefit of 
its factual determination that they did not intend to kill or 
harm anyone. The death of Officer House, however, is irrefutable 
evidence of the grave risk of injury and death created and 
furthered by these defendants. Defendants1 armed resistance to 
lawful warrants is a far cry from nonviolent civil disobedience 
and passive resistance. Thoreau, Gandhi and Martin Luther King 
practiced nonviolent civil disobedience and passive resistance in 
protesting alleged unfair laws, regulations and practices. They 
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did not, however, engage in armed conflict and were willing to 
accept the legal consequences of their conduct. These defendants 
bore arms in support of their views and to avoid the consequences 
of Addam Swappfs conduct. In doing so, the jury found that they 
caused the death of Officer House. 
In addition to the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the risk these defendants continue to pose to society 
is another common factor. Each defendant has expressed his 
remorse for the death of Officer House. Such remorse, however, 
is of little significance in light of each defendant's failure to 
express remorse for the creation of the dangerous circumstances 
causing Officer House's death. Defendants' failure to accept 
responsibility for the consequences of their acts places society 
at continued risk. These defendants acted as anarchists and this 
court has been presented with no credible information that, if 
given the opportunity, they would not again engage in anarchism 
and armed conflict. 
The court has carefully considered each of the factors 
presented by each of the individual defendants in support of 
running this court's sentences concurrent with the federal 
sentences. Suffice it to say that such factors do not overcome 
the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the continuing 
risk to society. To run this court's sentences concurrent with 
the federal sentences would require this court to disregard the 
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death of Officer House. The death of Officer House was not a 
consideration or an element in the federal prosecution. His 
death, however, was the sine qua non of the state prosecutions. 
This court acknowledges that at some time in the future one 
or more of the defendants may no longer pose a risk to society. 
The indeterminate sentencing scheme of the State of Utah will 
allow defendants Addam Swapp and Timothy Singer the opportunity 
to persuade the Board of Pardons that confinement for the maximum 
State term will not be necessary. They will be given that 
opportunity following the completion of their federal confinement 
and after they begin to serve their consecutive State terms. 
Jonathan Swapp will be given a similar opportunity by requesting 
this court to review its sentence upon completion of his federal 
sentence. 
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the motion of 
Addam Swapp and the request of Timothy Singer to be sentenced for 
a crime lower in degree than that for which they were convicted 
and orders imposition of the following sentences: 
Addam Swapp shall serve a term of 1 to 15 years in 
the Utah State Penitentiary which term will run 
consecutively to and at the end of any and all 
determinate sentences imposed in United States v. Addam 
Swapp, No. 88-CR-006J with the limitation, however, 
that, in accordance with Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code 
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Ann., the aggregate maximum term of all sentences 
imposed in this case and the above-referenced federal 
case shall in no event exceed thirty (30) years. 
Timothy Singer shall serve a term of 1 to 15 years 
in the Utah State Penitentiary which term will run 
consecutively to and at the end of any and all 
determinate sentences imposed in United States v, 
Timothy Singer, No. 88-CR-006J with the limitation, 
however, that, in accordance with Section 76-3-401(4), 
Utah Code Ann., the aggregate maximum term of all 
sentences imposed in this case and the above-referenced 
federal case shall in no event exceed thirty (30) 
years. 
Jonathan Swapp shall serve a term of 12 months in 
the Salt Lake County Jail, which terra will run 
consecutively to and at the end of any and all 
determinate sentences imposed in United States v. 
Jonathan Swapp, No. 88-CR-006J, with the limitation, 
however, that, in accordance with Section 76-3-401(4), 
Utah Code Ann., the aggregate maximum term of all 
sentences imposed in this case and the above-referenced 
federal case shall in no event exceed thirty (30) 
years. 
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Each of the defendants will be given credit for time served 
since the execution of the Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum 
to the extent credit therefor is not applied to the federal 
sentences. The determination of the amount of credit due, if 
any, to Addam Swapp and Timothy Singer shall be made by the Board 
of Pardons consistent with this Sentencing Decision, 
Defendant Addam Swapp's Motion for Abatement and Continuance 
of Sentencing is denied. 
Dated this 26th day of January, 1989. 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Sentencing Decision, to the following, 
this 2 6th day of January, 1989: 
Creighton C. Horton II 
David J. Schwendiman 
Assistant Attorneys General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
John R. Bucher 
Attorney for Addam W. Swapp 
1518 South 1100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Earl Spafford 
Attorney for Jonathan R. Swapp 
425 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Attorney for John Timothy Singer 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADDAM SWAPP, 
VICKIE L. SINGER, 
JONATHAN R. SWAPP, and 
JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER, 
Defendants. 
88-CR-0006J 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
At the time sentences were pronounced in this case, the 
court reserved the right to write on questions of sentencing, and 
to set forth his reasons in amplified form for imposing sentence 
as to certain counts, and for deferring the imposition of sentence 
on Count II. 
Two of the defendants, Addam Swapp, and Vickie Singer, 
were charged and convicted of the below described offenses, among 
others. Such offenses were charged as Counts I and II in the 
Superseded Indictment, as modified. (The counts were originally 
Count II and III in the Superseded Indictment. During pre-trial 
proceedings, a conspiracy count, which bore the label Count I, was 
dismissed on motion of the United States, and the remaining counts 
were re-numbered.) 
Counts I and II as re-numbered and modified read as 
follows: 
COUNT I 
A. On or about January 16, 1988, in the 
Central Division of the District of Utah, 
ADDAM W. SWAPP, 
and VICKIE L. SINGER, 
did knowingly and maliciously damage and 
attempt to damage, by means of an explosive, 
a building, to wit: the Kamas Utah Stake 
Center of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints located at 3038 North 
Highway 189, Marion, Utah, a building used in 
interstate and foreign commerce and in an 
activity affecting interstate and foreign 
commerce, and did aid and abet therein; all in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(1) and (2). 
COUNT II 
A. On or about January 16, 1988, in the 
Central Division of the District of Utah, 
ADDAM W. SWAPP, 
and VICKIE L. SINGER 
did knowingly use and aid and abet in the use 
of a deadly and dangerous weapon and device, 
to wit: a bomb, during and in relation to the 
crime of violence set forth in Count I above, 
which is incorporated herein by reference; all 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and (2). 
At the time of final argument, the United States Attorney 
made the following statement (R-9): 
The elements of proof that the government 
has to meet and satisfy you beyond a 
reasonable doubt about are similar to all 
three of these bomb-related offenses. And let 
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me just take them one at a time and run 
through the elements for you so that you111 
have insight into what the elements of the 
offense are when the court later instructs 
you. Count I charged that on or about the 
16th of January the defendant used an 
explosive, in this case a bomb, to damage the 
Kamas Stake Center. Thatfs the first element. 
The second element is that the Kamas Stake 
Center was a building used in an activity 
affecting interstate commerce. Thatfs the 
second element the government must meet. And 
third, that the defendant acted maliciously. 
The second count has just two elements. 
One is that the defendant committed the crime 
of violence charged in Count I maliciously 
damaging the stake center, and second, that 
the defendant knowingly carried or used a bomb 
during or in relation to that crime of 
violence. 
That statement reiterated the theory of prosecution, then 
argued and previously presented by the United States at trial. 
18 U.S.C. § 844(i) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys 
or attempts to damage or destroy by means of 
fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, 
or other real or personal property used in 
interstate or foreign commerce or in any 
activity affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than 
ten years or fined not more than $10,000 or 
both. 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) provides as follows: 
Whoever, during and in relation to any 
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, 
including a crime of violence or drug 
trafficking crime, which provides for an 
enhanced punishment if committed by the use of 
a deadly or dangerous weapon or device, for 
which he may be prosecuted in a court of the 
United States, uses or carries a firearm, 
shall, in addition to the punishment provided 
for such crime of violence or drug trafficking 
crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five 
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years, and if the firearm is a machine gun, or 
is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm 
muffler, to imprisonment for ten years* In 
the case of his second or subsequent 
conviction under this section, such person 
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for ten 
years, and if the firearm is a machine gun, or 
is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm 
muffler, to imprisonment for twenty years. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
the court shall not place on probation or 
suspend the sentence of any person convicted 
of a violation of this subsection, nor shall 
the term of imprisonment imposed under this 
subsection run concurrently with any other 
term of imprisonment including that imposed 
for the crime of violence or drug trafficking 
crime, or drug trafficking crime in which the 
firearm was used or carried. No person 
sentenced under this subsection shall be 
eligible for parole during the term of 
imprisonment imposed herein. 
At the time sentence was imposed on Count I as to Addam 
Swapp, and on Count I as to Vickie Singer, the court in each 
instance deferred sentencing each defendant as to Count II, stating 
the same would be unlawfully cumulative or duplicative of the 
sentence imposed in each instance on Count I. The court called 
attention, as well, to Instructions numbered 33, 42, and 47. 
Some special interrogatories and instructions were 
presented to the jury as part of a verdict form. (Special Verdict 
form and jury responses noted thereon). 
The question presented is very narrow. It is concerned 
with Congressional intent. 
It is concerned, also, as to how statutes as an 
expression of Congressional intention are to be reconciled, if 
reconciliation is possible, in their application to the peculiar 
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facts common to Counts I and II. 
Although the provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is 
frequently referred to as a penalty enhancement provision, it is 
in reality a separate offense. Simpson v United States, 435 U.S. 
6, 10 (1978). See: H. R. Rep. No. 495, 99th Cong. 2nd Sess. 10, 
reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 1327, 1336. It 
is well established that a defendant may be convicted of two 
separate offenses arising from a single act, so long as each 
requires a proof of fact not essential to the other. United States 
v. Crew. 538 F.2d 575, 577 (4th Cir. 1976). In Blockbuster v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1931), the Supreme Court held that 
"where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two 
district statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine 
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each 
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. 
at 304. 
The Court was presented, by way of pleading and proof, 
with a transaction which was essentially identical as to Counts I 
and II, although the nature of the participation by Addam Swapp, 
and Vickie Singer factually varied. 
Unlike most situations where 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) is 
invoked, the transaction proved for Count II is essentially the 
same transaction as that proved for Count I. In short, nothing 
factually new is added for Count II. 
The penalty provision of 18 U.S.C. § 844 (i) provides for 
a discretionary penalty with no floor, and a ceiling of ten years. 
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The penalty provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) has a mandatory 
provision of five years, with a common floor and ceiling* 
As to Count I, the court, within limits, is empowered by 
Congress to exercise its discretion in fashioning an appropriate 
penalty. Such seems to be the express intention of Congress. 
Congress provided a penalty ceiling and no floor, as it relates to 
the transaction alleged and proved in Count 1. 
The court, when called upon to impose a penalty for what 
is essentially the same transaction (Count II), is called upon to 
do something which is in derogation of the penalty instruction as 
to Count I, and which would modify or nullify the exercise of court 
discretion as to Count I. 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) as written, published, and 
punctuated, is ambiguous. The problem of finding meaning is 
somewhat helped by Congressional history, which provides a basis 
for finding that the comma which appears after the words "including 
a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime^" ought not to be 
there, even though it is there. H. R. Rep. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 
2nd Sess. 312-315, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 
3182, 3490-3492. 
If one omits the comma, then the statute seems to track 
the Congressional history. It seems to have been passed to 
overturn some aspects of United States v. Simpson, 435 U.S. 6 
(1978), and United States v. Busic, 446 U.S. 398, bank robbery and 
assault on a federal officer cases, respectively. 
But, even granting that, the very narrow question as to 
Congressional intent remains, namely, where the pleadings and the 
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proof relating to a primary offense (Count I) are essentially 
identical with the pleading and the proof of a second count of 
which the first is usually a component, but in this case 
essentially identical, did Congress intend that a discretionary 
punishment imposed for the act complained of in Count I be modified 
by a mandatory sentence for essentially the same transaction 
pleaded and proved in Count II. 
The court is then faced with a paradox, in essence 
conflicting Congressional instructions. The Congressional signal 
flashes both red and green. The hexagonal sign says both stop and 
go. 
Which of the conflicting signals did Congress intend the 
court to follow? How can the court exercise discretion and not 
exercise discretion at the same time in providing punishment for 
what is essentially the same transaction. 
The court resolved the dilemnu., the apparent conflict, 
by following the instruction of Congress as to Count I and by 
exercising its discretion as to Count I. 
Because the pleading and proof as to Count II were 
essentially identical to Count I, the court followed a time honored 
method of deferring sentencing on what was essentially the same 
transaction. 
Other courts have been faced with similar situations. 
In United States v. Olivas, 558 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1977), the 
defendant was indicted and convicted of four narcotics offenses 
arising out of two separate transactions. The district court 
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imposed on each count a seven year term, as well as a three year 
term to run concurrently. The Tenth Circuit noted that Counts III 
and IV were based on a single transfer of heroin on June 2nd, and 
that Counts I and II were based on a single transfer of heroin 
which occurred on May 16th. While it affirmed the convictions, the 
case was remanded with directions to vacate one of the concurrent 
sentences imposed on Counts I and II, and one of the concurrent 
sentences imposed on Counts III and IV. In reaching its decision, 
the court referred to Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957), 
which holds that Congress did not intend to increase the maximum 
sentence when two violations of the same statute are shown by a 
single act. It then looked to decisions reached by other circuits 
and stated: 
We agree with the Fourth and Sixth 
Circuits that separate sentences may not be 
imposed for offenses arising from th'> same 
transaction. The anomaly of a conviction 
going apparently unvindicated does not bar the 
correction of sentence. One sentence for each 
transaction achieves a just result consistent 
with legislative intent. See: United States 
v. Stevens, 521 F.2d at 337. 
558 F.2d at 1368. 
In a similar situation, United States v. Arbelaez, 812 
F.2d 530, (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
Defendant's conviction on Count I, conspiracy to possess cocaine 
with intent to distribute, on Count II, aiding and abetting the 
distribution of cocaine, and on Count III, aiding and abetting the 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The Court 
affirmed his sentence on Count I, but remanded with instructions 
to the district court "to vacate and stay the entry of judgment 
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and the imposition of sentence on either Count II or Count III.11 
812 F.2d 530, 534. 
Olivas and Arbelaez each involve 18 U.S.C. § 841(a(1) where 
Congressional intent to impose separate punishments is not in 
doubt. However, in these cases, while under this particular 
statute the defendant could be convicted on both counts, the 
sentence was vacated. Furthermore, the rationale behind allowing 
the imposition of separate punishments was Mto give maximum 
flexibility to judges, permitting them to tailor the period of 
imprisonment, as well as the fine, to the circumstances involved 
in the individual case." United States v. DeJesus. 806 F.2d 31, 
36 (2d Cir. 1986), citations omitted. In another case out of the 
9th Circuit, United States v. Wilson. 781 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 
1986), the defendant was tried and convicted of possession of 
piperidine with knowledge that it would be used to manufacture PCP, 
of manufacturing PCP, and of attempting to manufacture PCP. In the 
case, the defendant began, but did not complete, the process of 
manufacturing PCP. The court noted that there was no reason to 
hold here, any more than there was in Prince, that Congress 
intended multiple punishments for the criminal who completes more 
than one step of the crime and held that, while the defendant was 
properly charged and tried on separate counts for each step, he 
could be convicted and sentenced for only one. 782 F.2d 1438, 
1440. 
It seemed to this court at the time of sentencing, and 
it seems to the court now, that it is unlawfully cumulative that 
one should be punished (Count I) for destroying a building through 
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the use of a bomb, and that one should be further punished (Count 
II) for destroying the same building through the use of the same 
bomb. 
It further seemed to the court that in imposing 
punishment for what is essentially the same transaction that 
Congress, if it desired, could well have amended 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) 
and provided a floor of five years. This it didn't do. Discretion 
remained with the court. By not doing so, it provided the 
sentencing court with a dilemma as to what Congress really intended 
to do. 
The Court deferred as to Count II, vindicating a verdict 
as to a redundant count, but withholding sentence on the theory 
that Congress could not have intended that one be sentenced twice 
for the same unlawful transaction in ways which conflict. 
Had the United States Attorney charged in Count II, which 
he did not, that in carrying the bomb to the site where it was 
used, the defendants carried with them as well some other device 
(such as a rifle, for example) other than the material alleged in 
Count 1, then the sentencing result could well be different. 
Neither the pleadings nor the proof in this instance supply that 
needed variation, that additional element, which to the court seems 
essential to justify the imposition of additional punishment. 
This rationale relates only to Counts I and II. It has 
no relevance to any other application of § 924(c)(1) in this case. 
As to certain remaining counts, the court was called upon 
to examine the last minute suggestion of the United States that as 
to certain counts under § 944(c)(1), a minimum mandatory sentence 
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of 10 years should be imposed under the provision of the statute 
which "In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under 
this section, such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 
ten years . . . ." 
Up until that moment, the United States had always taken 
the position that the appropriate penalty to be applied was five 
years, as to certain counts. Such was contained in the pre-
sentence report, and was relied upon by the parties* In support 
of its new position, the United States cited a case from Georgia, 
United States v. Rawlings. 821 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1987), found 
the night before the sentencing. The court is of the opinion the 
authority is distinguishable and non-persuasive. There is no 10th 
Circuit case on the subject. All of the events in this case were 
intimately connected. All were the subject of a common indictment. 
All were presented and considered by the jury at the same time. 
All were concurrently reported on by the jury. In the opinion of 
the Court none of the § 944(c) (1) counts could be said to be second 
or subsequent to the others. The position of the United States, 
originally taken, seems to the court to have been the correct and 
appropriate position. 
The court sentenced based on that understanding. There 
is an old and venerable rule of construction called the rule of 
lenity. Basically, it admonishes that one resolve questions of 
doubt as to Congressional intent in favor of a defendant. In 
short, in the interest of fairness, ambiguities and conflicts 
should be resolved with a defendant given the benefit 
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of the doubt. As noted in United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 
1317 (10th Cir. 1987), "Where the statute and legislative history 
are not clear, we are governed by the principle of lenity: f[I]f 
Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly 
and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a 
single transaction into multiple offenses. . . .,M (citations 
omitted). 
Such practice symbolizes that sentencing means something 
more than organized vengeance. Deterrence, individual and social, 
and the possibility for repentance and personal change still remain 
as values in the sentencing process, even though in the eyes of 
some, such optimism as to the nature of a convicted defendant may 
seem terribly old fashioned. The values find credence and 
respectability in history although they seem to have been almost 
forgotten in the history of the last decade. 
DATED this ^hjn day of January, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
W^\K^>J^ - ^ 
BRU&E S. JENKINS, chief Judge 
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ARGUMENT 
I THE COURT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DEFERRING SENTENCING OF THE 
DEFENDANT ON COUNT II OF THE AMENDED SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT ON THE 
GROUNDS THAT TO DO SO WOULD BE TO IMPERMISSABLY ACCUMULATE 
SENTENCES. 
Count I of the Amended Superseding Indictment charges that on 
January 16, 1988, the defendant did damage by explosive a building 
used in interstate commerce and did aid and abet therein in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. 844(i). 
Count II of the Amended Superseding Indictment charges that 
on the same date as Count I, the defendant used a bomb in relation 
to the commission of Count I which is the bombing of the building. 
Appellee Addam Swapp urges that it would be permissible to 
violate and be punished under Count I and Count II consecutively 
if Count I were violated by the use of something other than the 
bomb of Count I. 
However, in the case at bar the government charged that the 
violation of Count I took place by the use of the very device of 
the Count II violation. The allegations then in Count II are the 
same as in Count I because in actual fact the devices were the same 
and used for the same event and at the same time. 
The government's reliance on United States v. Chalan, 812 F. 
1302 (10th Cir. 1987) is misplaced in regards to the operation of 
18 U.S.C. 924(c). 
1 
In Chalan the decision held that the defendant committed only 
a single crime of violence for purposes of double jeopardy. 
Defendant Chalan was convicted of murder during the commission of 
a robbery and the 924(c) charge for the use of a firearm during 
that murder and the 924(c) charge of carrying a firearm in the 
commission of a robbery, the trial court sentenced consecutively 
on the 18 U.S.C. 924(c) counts under the consecutive sentence 
provisions of the section. 
The Chalan decision however holds that to run the 924(c) 
sections consecutively is contrary to the Blockburger v. U.S., 284 
U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, standard for Double Jeopardy Clause 
problems. The Blockburger test is whether one offense requires 
proof of fact which the other does not. Indeed, the Chalan 
decision states that using that test, first degree murder and 
robbery would be separate offenses if the murder conviction were 
premised on something other than the robbery. Chalan Supra, at 
1316. 
Such is the situation with the case at bar. There is no added 
fact or element differing Count I and Count II of the Amended 
Superseding Indictment. 
The contention that any argument contrary to consecutive 
sentences for a substantive offense and 18 U.S.C. 924(c) fails 
because Congress has spoken is not responsive to the problem posed 
by offenses which are identical in all important respects. The 
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defendant was not charged or convicted with the use of a rifle in 
relation to the bombing of a L.D.S. Stakehouse but was convicted 
of the use of a bomb in relation to the use of the same bomb. 
The situation is similar to the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
U.S. v. Wilson, 781 F. 1438 (1986). 
In Wilson, the defendant was convicted of possession of a 
controlled substance with knowledge it would be used to manufacture 
PCP, manufacturing PCP and attempting to manufacture PCP. He was 
sentenced consecutively. The same manufacturing process was 
involved-one criminal undertaking. The court concluded at Wilson, 
p. 1440 that because of the identity of the substance and the 
"sameness" of the criminal transaction that the consecutive 
sentences should be vacated. 
Even though those cases involve multiple prosecution and 
sentences for different stages of the same manufacturing process 
rather than the application of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) to a substantive 
offense, the rationale is the same. Congress did not intend not 
could it have intended to punish the very same act consecutively. 
The trial court found that the events, instrumentalities and 
parties were identical in Count I and Count II of the Amended 
Superseding Indictment except for the nature of the participation 
of Addam Swapp and Vicki Singer. (See Memorandum Opinion dated 
January 4, 1989 attached hereto.) 
3 
The Chalan decision Supra at 1317 cites that line of cases 
invoking the rule of lenity in favor of the defendant where the 
legislature has not spoken without ambiguity in single transaction 
issues, (see Bell v. U.S., 349 U.S. 81, 84, 75 S. Ct. 620) 
II DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN INVOKING THE RULE OF LENITY TO 
SITUATIONS CALLING FOR CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR SINGLE 
TRANSACTIONS. 
18 U.S.C. 3742 (d) reads: 
(d) Consideration,-Upon review of the record, the court of 
appeals shall determine whether the sentence-
(1) was imposed in violation of law; 
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect 
application of sentencing guidelines; or 
(3) is outside the range of the applicable 
sentencing guideline, and is unreasonable, having 
regard for-
(A) the factors to be considered in 
imposing a sentence, as set forth in 
chapter 227 of this title; and 
(B) the reasons for the imposition of 
the particular sentence, as stated by the 
district court pursuant to the provisions 
of section 3553(c). 
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the 
opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the 
district court unless they are clearly erroneous. 
The government, under the Chalan reasoning, could have charged 
the damage to a building in Interstate Commerce without the use of 
a bomb (malicious destruction) and then successfully enhanced that 
violation with an 18 U.S.C. 924(c) violation, but the 18 U.S.C. 
844(i) Count of the bombing of the building contained an enhanced 
sentence of ten years for the use of the concededly dangerous bomb. 
The Chalan Decision concluded at p.1317: 
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In Sum, Blockburger dictates that Chalan committed 
only a single "crime of violence" for purposes of 
double jeopardy. 
The appellee/defendant maintains that the issue of lenity 
exists by virtue of the enhanced penalty for the same criminal 
episode as the offense of Count I and the trial judge should be 
given discretion to find that a legislative intent exists and to 
defer a cumulative sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant/cross-appellee contends the trial judge has an 
area of discretion in sentencing of defendants convicted of crimes 
calling for possible unfair and impermissible cumulative sentences. 
The defendant also contends that the reasoning of U.S. v. 
Chalan supra, and the cases cited therein are essentially holding 
that an enhanced penalty for the same act which was subject to the 
enhancement of a substantive charge such as found in 18 U.S.C. 
844(i) should not be allowed. 
STATEMENT OF COUNSEL REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Counsel for the defendant/cross-appellee believes oral 
argument to be useful in this proceeding. 
John R. Bucher 
5 
